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Abstract
In this paper, the problem of writing on a dirty paper in the presence of jamming is examined. We consider an AWGN
channel with an additive white Gaussian state and an additive adversarial jammer. The state is assumed to be known non-causally
to the encoder and the jammer but not to the decoder. The capacity of the channel in the presence of a jammer is determined.
A surprising result that this capacity is equal to the capacity of a relaxed version of the problem, where the state is also known
non-causally to the decoder, is proved.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study the problem of ‘writing on a dirty paper’ [1] in the presence of an intelligent jammer. In the absence of a jammer,
the problem of writing on a dirty paper is a channel coding problem where the transmitter wants to send a message over an
AWGN channel with additive interference, and the interference is known to the transmitter non-causally. Under the assumption
of only the receiver knowing the interference, we know that the receiver can completely cancel it out. However, in a celebrated
result [1] Costa showed that even in the scenario when only the transmitter (and not the receiver) possessed the knowledge of
the interference, it can be completely mitigated using a novel coding scheme called Dirty Paper Coding (DPC). Through this
coding scheme, it was shown that the capacity of this channel is equal to the capacity of one with no state.
In our problem, we have an additional entity, viz., an adversarial jammer in the communication setup. Not only is the user
aware of the additive interference in the channel as in [1], but so also is the jammer. Through the choice of its channel input the
user aims to maximize its communication rate over the AWGN channel. In contrast, the adversarial jammer aims to minimize
the user communication rate through an appropriately chosen jamming signal. Thus, we have a non-cooperative game between
the user and the additive jammer. Since both the user and the jammer compete over the same quantity, this non-cooperative
game is a zero sum game [2].
Jamming in communication systems has been widely studied through the use of non-cooperative game theory. Bas¸ar, in [3],
studied the problem of communicating a Gaussian random variable over an AWGN channel in the presence of a jammer.
In [4], Me´dard studied the channel coding problem of communicating a message over an AWGN channel in the presence of
a jammer, where the jammer is correlated to the user transmission. Here, the user and the jammer compete over the channel
mutual information and the resulting zero sum game is shown to have an equilibrium saddle point, where, the equilibrium
utility is defined as the capacity of the AWGN channel in the presence of a jammer. This game was extended to the MIMO
fading scenario in [5]. Shafiee et. al in [6] studied this mutual information game between the user and the jammer over the
AWGN Multi-Access Channels (MAC). They also studied similar formulations over the Fading AWGN MAC with jammer
under different assumptions on the channel state knowledge at the users and the jammer.
In this paper, we study the problem of writing on a dirty paper in the presence of an additive jammer, where the state is
assumed to be additive white Gaussian. Also, both the user and the jammer are assumed to have a non-causal access to this
additive channel state. We formulate and analyse a zero sum mutual information game, called Costa game in the sequel, where
the user and the jammer, maximize and minimize respectively, a well motivated mutual information quantity (different from
that in [4]). It is well-known that all Nash equilibria in a zero sum game possess identical value of utility [2]. For a channel
with an adversarial jammer, define its capacity as follows.
Definition 1 (Capacity). The capacity of the channel in the presence of the jammer is the unique Nash equilibrium utility of
the zero sum communication game between the user and the jammer.
We first determine a Nash equilibrium saddle point for the Costa game, where the user strategy is the DPC strategy and
the jamming strategy is i.i.d Gaussian jamming independent of state. We then determine the game utility at this equilibrium
and thus, establish the capacity of the AWGN channel with additive white Gaussian state and an additive adversarial jammer
under the assumption of non-causal state knowledge at the encoder and the jammer. We also study a relaxed version of the
said problem, where, in addition to the encoder and the jammer, the receiver too has non-causal knowledge of the state. We
call the corresponding zero sum game the Side Information (SI) game. A Nash equilibrium and the corresponding game utility
for this game are determined, which thence establish the capacity of the said channel. It is seen that the equilibrium Costa
game utility equals the equilibrium SI game utility. This proves an interesting result that the capacity of the AWGN channel
with additive white Gaussian state in the presence of a jammer, where the encoder and jammer have non-causal knowledge of
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2this state, is equal to the capacity of its relaxed version, where in addition to the encoder and the jammer, the receiver too has
non-causal knowledge of the state.
The following is the organization of the paper. In Section II, we describe the system model and discuss our problem setup
and the resulting non-cooperative zero sum game. We also review certain important and relevant results on the capacity of
channels with state. We state the main results of this work in Section III. Then, in Section IV, we perform the analysis of the
game and prove the results stated in Section III. The last section is devoted towards stating certain important implications of
our results as well making some overall concluding remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. The Dirty Paper Coding Problem Setup with an Additive Jammer
Encoder Decoder
Jammer
Fig. 1. The Costa Game Setup
Consider the communication setup in Fig. 1. Here, the sender wishes to send a message m to the receiver through n uses
of a channel in the presence of a jammer. The communication channel, henceforth called the Costa channel with a jammer, is
an AWGN channel with an additive white Gaussian state and an additive adversarial jammer. Let Y n = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) be
the signal received at the decoder, where
Y n = Xn + Sn + Jn + Zn.
Here, Xn, Sn, Jn and Zn are the user’s input to the channel, white Gaussian state, jammer’s input to the channel and the
independent channel noise respectively. Since the state is white Gaussian, Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , n are i.i.d and each Si ∼ N (0, σ2S).
The channel noise Zn is i.i.d Gaussian noise with each Zi ∼ N (0, σ2). The state Sn is known non-causally to only the encoder
and the jammer but not the decoder. Given the message m and the state Sn, the encoder picks a codeword Xn(m,Sn) and
transmits it on the channel over n successive time instants. For ease of notation we drop the reference to m and Sn. The
codeword Xn is so chosen as to satisfy the user power constraint PU i.e.
∑n
i=1X
2
i ≤ nPU . The jammer signal Jn, which is
a function of the state Sn, is chosen as to satisfy the jammer power constraint PJ i.e.
∑n
i=1 J
2
i ≤ nP¯J . Note that the jammer
is assumed to be unable to listen to the user transmission, and hence, is conditionally independent of the user signal Xn given
Sn.
B. Capacity of the channel in the absence of a jammer
We now review some known results on the capacity of the Costa channel in the absence of a jammer. The discrete alphabet
version of the problem in Fig. 1, in the absence of the jammer, was solved in [7]. Here, it was shown that the capacity of a
channel with a random state, where the state is known non-causally at the encoder only, is given as
CGP = max
p(u,x|s)
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S). (1)
Here, U is an auxiliary random variable and the subscript GP stands for Gelfand-Pinsker.
The Gaussian version of the above problem with additive white Gaussian state was studied by Costa in [1]. Here, the
surprising result, that the effect of the additive state can be completely eliminated under state knowledge only at the encoder,
was proved. Thus, the the capacity of an AWGN channel with a white Gaussian state, where the state is known non-causally
only at the encoder, is equal to the capacity of the standard AWGN channel with no state. This capacity, denoted by CC where
the subscript C stands for Costa, is
CC =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PU
σ2
)
.
The coding scheme to achieve this capacity is popularly known as the ‘Dirty Paper Coding’ scheme. For a length n code [8],
the optimal auxiliary variable Un is i.i.d with Ui = Xi + αSi, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where Xn is i.i.d with Xi ∼ N (0, PU ),
i = 1, 2, . . . , n and α = PU/(PU + σ2).
3C. The Non-Cooperative Costa Game Setup
We model the user and jammer interaction in Fig. 1 as a non-cooperative game. We call this game the Costa game. In a
manner similar to [4], the user and the jammer compete over a channel mutual information quantity. Appealing to (1), let
this quantity be I(Un;Y n)− I(Un;Sn), where Un is an auxiliary random variable. The mutual information is evaluated for
some joint distribution p(sn, un, xn, jn, yn) = p(sn)p(un, xn|sn)p(jn|sn)p(yn|xn, jn). The user is the maximizing player and
chooses p(un, xn|sn) under its power constraint PU so as to maximize I(Un;Y n)−I(Un;Sn). The jammer is the minimizing
player and chooses p(jn|sn) under its power constraint PJ so as to minimize I(Un;Y n) − I(Un;Sn). Note that p(sn) and
p(yn|xn, sn, jn) are fixed. From Definition 1, we know that the equilibrium utility value of this game is defined as the capacity
of the Costa channel in the presence of a jammer. We therefore analyse this game and determine its equilibrium utility. Note
that the strategy spaces of the user and the jammer are both convex, and thus the game has a Nash equilibrium [2].
III. THE MAIN RESULT
Our main result is the characterization of an equilibrium of the Costa game and thence, the determination of the capacity
of the AWGN channel with an additive state in the presence of an adversarial jammer, where the state is known non-causally
to both the user and the jammer. The equilibrium involves an i.i.d. Gaussian jamming strategy. For such a jamming strategy,
the jamming signal and the noise together act like white Gaussian noise. The resulting channel is the standard AWGN channel
with additive state analysed by Costa [1]. The user can employ DPC to achieve rates upto 1/2 log(1 + PU/(PU + PJ + σ2))
as shown in [1]. Such a user strategy for i.i.d. Gaussian jamming will henceforth be referred as DPC user strategy. We now
state our main result.
Theorem 2. The Dirty Paper Coding user strategy and the i.i.d. Gaussian jamming strategy independent of the state form a
Nash equilibrium of the Costa game.
As a consequence of the above theorem, we have the following Corollary.
Corollary 3. The capacity of the AWGN channel with an additive jammer and an additive white Gaussian state, where the
state is known non-causally to both the encoder and the jammer, is
CC−J =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PU
σ2 + PJ
)
. (2)
Here, the subscript J denotes the jammer. The proof of our main result will be discussed in the following section.
IV. THE COSTA GAME SADDLE POINT ANALYSIS
Toward the analysis of the Costa Game saddle point, we begin by studying a relaxed version of this game which we call
the Side Information (SI) game.
A. The Side Information (SI) Game
Most of the system setup in the SI game is identical to the setup in Fig. 1 except that Sn is also known non-causally at
the decoder. This communication channel is called in the Side Information (SI) channel in the presence of a jammer. This is
shown in Fig. 2. Before we discuss the SI game utility, we need to review a related result on the capacity of a channel with
Encoder Decoder
Jammer
Fig. 2. The Side Information Game Setup
state and no jamming adversary, with the state information available at both the encoder and the decoder. We first state the
result for the discrete version of the problem.
4Lemma 4 (Chap. 7, [8]). The capacity of a channel with a random state, where the state is known non-causally at both the
encoder and the decoder, is
C = max
p(x|s)
I(X;Y |S). (3)
For the Gaussian version of this problem, the capacity is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Chap. 7, [8]). The capacity of the AWGN channel with a white Gaussian state known both at the encoder and
decoder is
CSI =
1
2
log(1 +
PU
σ2
).
The maximizing user channel input distribution is i.i.d. Gaussian.
Here, the subscript SI stands for Side Information. Coming back to the SI game, let us now define the game utility.
Alluding to the expression in (3), let the SI game utility be the mutual information quantity I(Xn;Y n|Sn). Here, the the
mutual information is evaluated for some joint distribution p(sn, xn, jn, yn) = p(sn)p(xn|sn)p(jn|xn)p(yn|xn, jn). The user
is the maximizing player while the jammer is the minimizing player in this zero sum game. The user chooses p(xn|sn) given
its power constraint PU so as to maximize I(Xn;Y n|Sn). The jammer chooses p(jn|sn) under its power constraint PJ so as
to minimize I(Xn;Y n|Sn). Note again that p(sn) and p(yn|xn, sn, jn) are fixed.
A Nash equilibrium of the SI game is now given in the following lemma. Here, the equilibrium involves an i.i.d. Gaussian
jamming strategy. Hence, the jamming signal and the noise together act like white Gaussian noise. The resulting channel is the
standard AWGN channel with additive state, where the state is known both to the encoder and the decoder. The i.i.d. Gaussian
coding scheme which achieves capacity, is henceforth referred to as i.i.d. Gaussian user strategy in the SI game.
Lemma 6. The Side Information game has a Nash equilibrium saddle point. The i.i.d. Gaussian user strategy and the white
Gaussian jamming independent of state form a Nash equilibrium.
Before giving the proof details, we briefly discuss this result and state a corollary. Lemma 6 implies that when the user
employs an i.i.d. Gaussian strategy, the best jamming strategy is memoryless linear jamming and conversely, when the jammer
employs linear jamming, the best user strategy is i.i.d. Gaussian. Note that at equilibrium the jammer disregards the state
knowledge completely whilst choosing its jamming signal. Using Definition 1 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 7. The capacity of an AWGN channel with an additive jammer and an additive white Gaussian state, where the
state is known at both at the encoder and the decoder as well as the jammer, is
CSI−J =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PU
PJ + σ2
)
. (4)
Proof of Lemma 6: To prove this result, we first assume that the user signaling is i.i.d Gaussian and show that the best
jamming strategy is memoryless and linear in state. Then, we assume the jamming signal to be memoryless and linear in state
and prove that the best user signaling is i.i.d Gaussian signaling. With the strategies so determined, it will then follow that the
above pair of user and jammer strategies are the equilibrium saddle point strategies.
So let the user strategy be i.i.d Gaussian signaling. Recollect from previous discussion that the jammer aims to minimize
I(Xn;Y n|Sn). We know that
I(Xn;Y n|Sn) = h(Xn|Sn)− h(Xn|Y n, Sn). (5)
The jammer can only affect the second term of the RHS of (5). Thus, it will choose its signal Jn so as to maximize
h(Xn|Y n, Sn). Here, we have
h(Xn|Y n, Sn) = h(Xn −AY n −BSn|Y n, Sn) (6)
for any constant matrices A,B ∈ Rn×n. Since entropy decreases upon conditioning, we have
h(Xn −AY n −BSn|Y n, Sn) ≤ h(Xn −AY n −BSn). (7)
Here, let (AY n−BSn) be the LLSE estimate of Xn from the channel output Y n and the state Sn and hence, (Xn−AY n−BSn)
be the LLSE estimation error. Let the variance of this LLSE estimation error be Λe. Noting that the entropy is maximized by
a Gaussian distribution for a fixed covariance matrix [9] we have
h(Xn −AY n −BSn) ≤ 1
2
log((2pie)n|Λerr|) (8)
where, |Λerr| is the determinant of Λerr. Hence, from (6), (7) and (8), it is seen that
h(Xn|Y n, Sn) ≤ 1
2
log((2pie)n|Λerr|)
We now show that the best jamming strategy is Gaussian and jointly Gaussian with state Sn. For ease of notation given any
5signal V n = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn), we use the vector representation V = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn)T whenever necessary. Before proving
this result, we show that the best jammer strategy will be zero mean.
Claim 8. The best jamming strategy is a zero mean jamming strategy.
Proof: Let Jn be a feasible jamming strategy, where E[J] = µ. Let the resulting mutual information be I(Xn;Y n|Sn).
Now let us define another jamming strategy J˜n such that J˜ = J−µ, and where Y˜ n is the corresponding channel output. Note
that if Jn is a feasible jamming signal then so is J˜n since E[J˜T J˜] ≤ E[JTJ] ≤ PJ . Also note that E[J˜] = 0, where 0 is the
zero vector. Here we have,
I(Xn;Y n|Sn) = h(Y n|Sn)− h(Y n|Xn, Sn)
(a)
= h(Y n − µ)− h(Y n − µ|Xn, Sn)
= h(Y˜ n)− h(Y˜ n|Xn, Sn)
(b)
= I(Xn; Y˜ n|Sn).
Here, (a) follows by noting that entropy is invariant under translation [9]. (b) follows from the definition of mutual information.
Thus, for every feasible jamming strategy there exits an equivalent zero-mean jamming strategy which results in the same
mutual information value.
Thus, from here on all the jamming strategies considered are zero mean strategies.
Claim 9. A linear jamming strategy, jointly Gaussian with state, is the best jamming strategy.
Proof: Let Jn be the best choice for the jammer given an i.i.d Gaussian user strategy which minimizes h(Xn|Y n, Sn) and
let Λerr be the corresponding error covariance matrix. Since the error is the LLSE estimator error, Λerr is given as [9]
Λerr = ΛXX − ΛX,YΛ−1Y,YΛTX,Y.
Here, ΛXX and ΛYY are the autocovariance matrices of X, Y respectively and ΛXY the covariance matrix of X and Y . Let
us define a random variable R = Rn as
R = J− E[J
TS]
PS
S.
Observe that R is uncorrelated to S since E[RTS] = 0 = E[RT ]E[S] and E[S] = 0. Here, 0 is the n-length zero vector. Also
note that R is uncorrelated to X since
E[RTX] = ES[E[RTX|S]] (9a)
(a)
= ES[E[RT |S]E[X|S] (9b)
(b)
= ES[E[RT ]E[X|S] (9c)
= E[RT ]ES[E[X|S] (9d)
= E[RT ]E[X] (9e)
Here, (a) follows since given S, X and R are uncorrelated. R is uncorrelated to S and hence, we have (b). The rest then
follows in a straightforward manner.
Now, the average power of the jamming signal J = E[J
TS]
PS
S+R is
E[JTJ] = E[RTR] +
E[STS]
PS
2 E
2[JTS]
= E[RTR] +
E2[JTS]
PS
Here, we have used the facts that R is uncorrelated to S, E[S] = 0 and E[STS] = PS . Also, recall that feasibility requires
that E[JTJ] ≤ PJ .
We now define a linear jammer whose jamming signal J′ = J ′n is given as
J′ =
E[JTS]
PS
S+R′.
Here, R′ = (R′1, R
′
2, . . . , R
′
n) and R
′ ∼ N (E[R],KRR). Since E[J] = 0 and E[S] = 0, it follows that E[R] = 0. Also, R′n
is independent of state Sn. It can be directly seen that J′ and J are such that
E[J′TJ′] = E[JTJ]
Thus, the linear jammer with jamming signal J ′n has the same average power as that of the best jammer Jn and hence, is a
6feasible jamming signal.
Now given the communication setup and a fixed input strategy, it is seen that if
KXY′ = KXY (10a)
KY′Y′ = KYY (10b)
where Y and Y′ are the channel outputs when the jammer strategy is J and J′ respectively, then Λerr′ = Λerr. Here Λerr′
is the error covariance matrix when the jammer is linear and is given as
Λerr′ = ΛXX − ΛX,Y′Λ−1Y′,Y′ΛTX,Y′ .
ΛY′Y′ is the autocovariance matrix of the channel output Y′ and ΛXY′ is the covariance matrix of X and Y′. Noting that
E[J] = 0 = E[J′], it is seen that (10) follows if
E[XJ′T ] = E[XJT ]
E[J′J′T ] = E[JJT ].
Now,
E[XJT ] = E
[
X
(
E[JTS]
PS
S+R
)T]
=
E[JTS]
PS
E[XST ] + E[XRT ]
(a)
=
E[JTS]
PS
E[XST ] + E[X]E[RT ] (11a)
(b)
=
E[JTS]
PS
E[XST ] + E[X]E[R′T ] (11b)
= E[XJ′T ]
Here, (a) follows from (9), and (b) from noting that E[R] = E[R′]. Similarly, we have
E[JJT ] = E
[(
E[JTS]
PS
S+R
)(
E[JTS]
PS
S+R
)T]
=
E2[JTS]
P 2S
E[SST ] +
E[JTS]
PS
(
E[RST ] + E[SRT ]
)
+ E[RRT ]
(a)
=
E2[JTS]
PS
E[SST ] +
E[JTS]
PS
(
E[R]E[ST ] + E[S]E[RT ]
)
+ E[RRT ] (11a)
(b)
=
E2[JTS]
PS
E[SST ] +
E[JTS]
PS
(
E[R′]E[ST ] + E[S]E[R′T ]
)
+ E[R′R′T ] (11b)
= E
[(
E[JTS′]
PS
S+R′
)(
E[JTS′]
PS
S+R′
)T]
= E[J′J′T ]
Here, we see that (a) is a result of R being uncorrelated to S. In the next step, (b) is true since R and R′ have the same
mean and covariance matrix. We thus have, Λerr′ = Λerr.
Finally, since J ′n is a Gaussian signal which is jointly Gaussian with Sn, the resulting LLSE estimator is the MMSE
estimator and the corresponding error is a Gaussian vector. Thus, we have the following
h(Xn −AY n −BSn|Y n, Sn) ≤ 1
2
log ((2pie)n|Λerr|)
=
1
2
log ((2pie)n|Λerr′ |)
= h(Xn −AY ′n −BSn)
= h(Xn −AY ′n −BSn|Y ′n, Sn)
= h(Xn|Y ′n, Sn) (12)
Hence, from (5) and (12) we have
I(Xn;Y n|Sn) ≥ I(Xn;Y ′n|Sn).
7This implies that the jointly Gaussian linear jamming is the best jamming strategy.
We now determine the nature of the this jamming signal. From now on, let Jn be the best Gaussian and jointly Gaussian
(with Sn) strategy. The feasibility requires that E[JTJ] ≤ PJ .
Claim 10. The i.i.d Gaussian jamming strategy, linear in state, is the best jamming strategy.
Proof: Consider h(Xn|Y n, Sn) again. From the entropy chain rule [9], we know that
h(Xn|Y n, Sn) =
n∑
i=1
h(Xi|Y n, Sn, Xi−11 ) (13)
where, Xi−11 = (X1, X2, . . . , Xi−1). Now since the user strategy is i.i.d Gaussian, we have
n∑
i=1
h(Xi|Y n, Sn, Xi−11 ) =
n∑
i=1
h(Xi|Y n, Sn). (14)
Noting that conditioning reduces entropy it follows that
n∑
i=1
h(Xi|Y n, Sn) ≤
n∑
i=1
h(Xi|Yi, Si). (15)
Thus, from (13), (14) and (15) we have
h(Xn|Y n, Sn) ≤
n∑
i=1
h(Xi|Yi, Si). (16)
Now the mutual information I(Xn;Y n|Sn), when the jamming strategy Jn is jointly Gaussian and linear in Sn, is
I(Xn;Y n|Sn) = h(Xn)− h(Xn|Y n, Sn)
(a)
=
(
n∑
i=1
h(Xi)
)
− h(Xn|Y n, Sn) (17a)
(b)
≥
n∑
i=1
(h(Xi)− h(Xi|Yi, Si)) (17b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi|Si)
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
′
i |Si) (17c)
= I(Xn;Y ′n|Sn)
Here, (a) follows from the fact that the user strategy is i.i.d Gaussian. (b) is a direct consequence of (16). Now, for (c) we have
the following. We know that (Xn, Sn, Zn, Jn, Rn, Y n) is jointly Gaussian. Let us define Fn = (Xn, Sn, Zn, Jn, Rn, Y n)
where, Fi = (Xi, Si, Zi, Ji, Ri, Yi). Since R is not a memoryless vector, it follows that J and Y are not memoryless
vectors. This also results in F not being memoryless. Now let us define a Gaussian vector R′ = (R′1, R
′
2, . . . , R
′
n), where
R′i ∼ N (0, σ2Ri), i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Next, let us define a new linear jamming strategy J ′n = (J ′1, J ′2, . . . , J ′n), i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
where J ′i = βSi + R
′
i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Note that J
′ is memoryless. Now since R′ and J′ are memoryless, it follows that
Y′ = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn), where Yi = Xi + Si + Zi + Ji and F′ = (F ′1, F
′
2, . . . , F
′
n), where F
′
i = (Xi, Si, Zi, J
′
i , R
′
i, Y
′
i ) are
also memoryless vectors. Observe that J ′n is a feasible jamming strategy as E[J′TJ′] = E[JTJ] ≤ PJ . Thus, by choosing the
jamming strategy in the above manner we have I(Xi;Yi|Si) = I(Xi;Y ′i |Si), and hence, equality in (c).
Finally, the R′ can be made i.i.d as the logarithm function in I(X;Y |S) is a concave function. Hence, the best linear
strategy is given as J ′i = βiSi +R
′
i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n where β is a constant and R
′
i ∼ N (0, σ2R′). Note that the average power
constraint dictates that β2σ2S + σ
′2
R ≤ PJ .
Before we determine the optimal values of (β, σ2R), we determine the best user strategy when the jamming strategy is i.i.d
Gaussian and linear in state.
Claim 11. If the jammer strategy is linear in state and i.i.d, the user employs i.i.d Gaussian signaling.
Proof: Let us assume that the jammer chooses an i.i.d signal Jn = (J1, J2, . . . , Jn), where Ji = βSi + Ri. Then, we
have the scenario depicted in Fig. 3. Here, Sˆn = (Sˆ1, Sˆ2, . . . , Sˆn) is the effective white Gaussian state of the channel and
Zˆn = (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, . . . , Zˆn) is the effective independent noise in the channel. Note that Sˆi = (1 + β)Si and Zˆi = Zi + Ri for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. This is an instance of a channel with state Sˆn, where Sˆn is known to the encoder and the decoder. From [8]
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and Lemma 6, we know that the capacity achieving user signaling for this channel is i.i.d Gaussian signaling.
We have thus determined the saddle point user and jammer strategies. Given the the saddle point jamming strategy Jn =
(J1, J2, . . . , Jn), where Ji = βSi +Ri the jammer chooses (β, σ2R) so as to induce the worst channel for the user. However,
the jammer is average power constrained and hence, β2σ2S + σ
2
R ≤ PJ . We now state the optimal value of (β, σ2R).
Claim 12. The saddle point jamming strategy is white Gaussian noise jamming.
Proof: Since the jammer behaviour at equilibrium is memoryless linear (in state) Gaussian jamming, note that from the
jammer’s perspective any component dependent on the state will be known at the encoder-decoder in the SI game which can
be completely canceled by the decoder. Thus, to maximize its adversarial impact on the mutual information, the jammer will
choose Jn to be completely independent of Sn and hence, β = 0 and σ2R = PJ . The jammer thus effectively acts as an
independent white Gaussian noise signal.
It follows that the equilibrium saddle point value, and thence the capacity of the channel, is given as in (4). This completes
the proof of Lemma 6.
We have seen that at equilibrium the jammer, even in the presence of state knowledge, disregards it completely whilst
choosing its jamming signal.
B. The Costa Game
We first show that the Costa game utility is upper bounded by the SI game utility. Recall that the player utility in the Costa
game is I(Un;Y n) − I(Un;Ss), where Un is an appropriate auxiliary variable, while the SI game utility is I(Xn;Y n|Sn).
We then have the following result.
Lemma 13. I(Un;Y n)− I(Un;Sn) ≤ I(Xn;Y n|Sn), where Un − (Xn, Sn)− Y n.
Proof: Using elementary entropy properties, we have
I(Un;Y n)− I(Un;Sn) = h(Un|Sn)− h(Un|Y n) (18)
Since entropy is decreased upon conditioning, it is seen that
h(Un|Sn)− h(Un|Y n) ≤ h(Un|Sn)− h(Un|Y n, Sn)
= I(Un;Y n|Sn)
Thus, it follows that
I(Un;Y n)− I(Un;Sn) ≤ I(Un;Y n|Sn). (19)
From the Markov chain Un − (Xn, Sn)− Y n it is seen that
I(Un;Y n|Sn) ≤ I(Xn;Y n|Sn). (20)
From (19) and (20), we finally have
I(Un;Y n)− I(Un;Sn) ≤ I(Xn;Y n|Sn).
Therefore, for any pair of user and jammer strategies the Costa game utility is upper bounded by the SI game utility. We
will come back to this result after we prove that the Costa game has a Nash equilibrium saddle point. We now prove Theorem 2.
9Proof of Theorem 2
The proof entails, firstly, the verification of the saddle point strategies given in Theorem 2. Then, it is shown that the utility
at this saddle point is as given in (2). We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 14. When the user strategy is DPC strategy, the best jamming strategy is white Gaussian jamming independent of
state.
Proof: For ease of notation given any signal V n = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn), we use the vector representation V = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn)T
whenever necessary. To begin with, let us fix the user strategy as the dirty paper coding strategy with α = PU/(PU +PJ +σ2).
Note that this user strategy is an i.i.d. Gaussian strategy. Recall that the jammer chooses a signal Jn with the aim to minimize
I(Un;Y n)− I(Un;Sn) in the Costa game. Since Jn is a feasible signal, we have E[JTJ] ≤ PJ . Referring to (18), it is seen
that the jammer can only affect the term h(Un|Y n) so as to minimize I(Un;Y n)− I(Un;Sn). Now for any Jn, we have
h(Un|Y n) (a)= h(Xn + αSn|Y n) (21a)
= h(Xn + αSn − αY n|Y n)
= h((1− α)Xn − αJn − αZn|Y n)
(b)
≤ h((1− α)Xn − αJn − αZn) (21b)
(c)
≤ 1
2
log ((2pie)n|ΛW |) . (21c)
Here, Wn = ((1 − α)Xn − αJn − αZn). Also, ΛW is the covariance matrix of Wn and |ΛW | its determinant. Note that
(a) follows from the fact that user employs a dirty paper coding scheme. Conditioning reduces entropy and hence, we have
(b). Finally, (c) is true from the well known fact that for a given covariance matrix, the Gaussian distribution maximizes
entropy [8].
Now, let us define another Gaussian jamming strategy J ′n = (J ′1, J
′
2, . . . , J
′
n), where J
′n ∼ N (0, PJIn) and J ′n is
independent of the state Sn. Here, In ∈ Rn×n is the identity matrix. Note that J ′n is a feasible jamming strategy since
E[J′TJ′] = PJ ≤ PJ . For the jamming strategy J ′n, let Y ′n be the corresponding channel output where
Y ′n = Xn + Sn + J ′n + Zn. (22)
Also, define W ′n as follows.
W ′n = ((1− α)Xn − αJ ′n − αZn) (23)
Let ΛW ′ be the covariance matrix of W ′n and let |ΛW ′ | be its determinant. Then, we have the following.
ΛW = (1− α2)ΛX + α2ΛJ + α2ΛZ (24a)
ΛW ′ = (1− α2)ΛX + α2ΛJ′ + α2ΛZ . (24b)
We now make a series of claims.
Claim 15. |ΛW | ≤ |ΛW ′ |.
Proof: Consider the following.
|ΛW |
(a)
≤
n∏
i=1
(
(1− α)2PU + α2E[J2i ] + α2σ2
)
(25a)
=
[ n∏
i=1
(
(1− α)2PU + α2E[J2i ] + α2σ2
)] 1nn
(b)
≤
(∑n
i=1
(
(1− α)2PU + α2E[J2i ] + α2σ2
)
n
)n
(25b)
=
(
(1− α)2PU + α2
∑n
i=1 E[J2i ]
n
+ α2σ2
)n
(c)
≤ ((1− α)2PU + α2PJ + α2σ2)n (25c)
= |(1− α)2PUIn + α2PJIn + α2σ2In|
= |(1− α2)ΛX + α2ΛJ′ + α2ΛZ |
(d)
= |ΛW ′ | (25d)
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Here, (a) follows from Hadamard’s inequality [8]. Since the Geometric Mean (GM) is less than the Arithmetic Mean (AM),
we have (b). The feasibility of the jammer strategy requires
∑n
i=1 E[J2i ] ≤ nPJ and hence, (c) is true. Finally, (d) follows
from (24).
Claim 16. W ′n is independent of Y ′n.
Proof: Since W ′n and Y ′n are Gaussian, it is sufficient to show that W ′n is uncorrelated to Y ′n i.e. E[W′Y′T ] =
E[W′]E[Y′T ]. We now proceed to establish this fact.
E[W′]E[Y′T ] = E[(1− α)X− αJ′ − αZ]E[Y′T ]
= 0.E[Y′T ] = 0.
Similarly,
E[W′Y′T ] = E[((1− α)X− αJ′ − αZ)Y′]
= E[(1− α)XY′T − αJ′Y′T − αZY′T ]
(a)
= E[(1− α)XXT − αJ′J′T − αZZT ] (26a)
= (1− α)PUIn − αPJIn − ασ2In
(b)
= 0. (26b)
Here, (a) follows from noting that Xn, Sn, J ′n and Zn are independently chosen, and in addition, since E[S] = 0, E[Z] = 0.
We also need E[X] = 0 and this follows from the fact that the user strategy is DPC. The equality in (b) follows from using
α = PU/(PU + PJ + σ
2) for the DPC.
We now complete the proof of Lemma 14 by showing that J ′n is the best feasible jamming signal. Here
h(Un|Y n)
(a)
≤ 1
2
log ((2pie)n|ΛW |) (26a)
(b)
≤ 1
2
log ((2pie)n|ΛW ′ |) (26b)
(c)
= h((1− α)Xn − αJ ′n − αZn) (26c)
(d)
= h((1− α)Xn − αJ ′n − αZn|Y ′n) (26d)
= h((1− α)Xn − αJ ′n − αZn + αY ′n|Y ′n)
(e)
= h(Un|Y ′n). (26e)
Now, (a) follows from (21) while (b) follows from Claim 15. Using the definition of W ′n in (23), (c) is true. Claim 16
results in the equality in (d). Finally, (e) follows from noting that Un = Xn + αSn and (22).
We discuss the equilibrium saddle point value after determining the best user strategy for an i.i.d. jamming strategy.
Lemma 17. When the jamming strategy is i.i.d. Gaussian, the best user strategy is the the dirty paper coding strategy.
Proof: Let us assume that the jammer chooses an i.i.d. signal Jn = (J1, J2, . . . , Jn), where Ji ∼ N (0, PJ). Then, we
have the scenario depicted in Fig. 4. Here, Zˆn = (Zˆ1, Zˆ2, . . . , Zˆn) is the effective independent noise in the channel, where
Encoder Decoder
Fig. 4. The Costa Game Equivalent Setup when Jamming is i.i.d. and independent of State
Zˆi = Zi + Ji for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. This is an instance of a channel with state Sn and noise Zˆn, where Sn is known to the
encoder . From [1], we know that the dirty paper code with α = PU/(PU + PJ + σ2) achieves the capacity for this channel.
This coding scheme is an i.i.d. Gaussian scheme.
Note that the above choice of saddle point strategies results in the saddle point value equal to CC−J given in (2). This
follows from the fact that this is an instance of a Costa channel where the average user power constraint is PU and the effective
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AWGN noise in the channel has variance σ2 + PJ . This equilibrium saddle point value is the capacity of the Costa channel
in the presence of the jammer. Finally, from (2) and (4), the surprising result that the capacity of the Costa channel in the
presence of jamming is equal to that of the Side Information channel with a jammer is seen to be true.
V. CONCLUSION
We examined the problem of the capacity of an AWGN channel with additive i.i.d. Gaussian state in the presence of an
additive jamming adversary, where the encoder and jammer had non-causal access to the state. The user-jammer interaction
was modeled as a zero sum game and the capacity of the channel, which was defined as the Nash equilibrium of this game,
was established. At equilibrium, the user strategy was dirty paper coding and the jammer strategy was i.i.d. Gaussian jamming.
Interestingly, however, this equilibrium jamming signal was independent of state. A surprising result, that the capacity was
unchanged even if, in addition to the encoder and the jammer, the decoder too had non-causal knowledge of the state, was
proved.
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